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See 6 Cuba
*X Aug 2**X Pers 3 L. SAUVAGE*

Views Of Other Editors

Third Choice In Cuba

Washington Post — Discussions of what to do about Cuba are invariably couched in alternatives. The first is to tolerate the Soviet arms buildup, but to contain the Castro regime — a course that can have disastrous consequences in Latin America if it is interpreted as a sign of weakness and irresolution.

The second is to intervene militarily through an invasion or blockade. Besides risking Soviet retaliation in Berlin or other vulnerable areas, an invasion would also bring the tragic prospect of prolonged and bloody American occupation and of riots in virtually every Latin-American capital.

Curiously, a third course has received little apparent official attention — the course of deliberately and skillfully encouraging an internal up-

rising within Cuba that could immediately be assisted by outside arms. The lack of discussion here is especially odd since the Kennedy Administration came to power with a determination to develop a capacity in unconventional warfare and to broaden the spectrum of military response.

Evidence from Cuba indicates that there is considerable latent dissatisfaction among officers and officials in the Castro regime. Leo Sauvage, a shrewd French correspondent writing in *The Reporter*, maintains that the Soviet forces in Cuba are a clear indication that Castro can no longer rely on his own army and militia. "A national uprising within Cuba . . ." he writes, "might well succeed, especially if the CIA gave up playing politics and at last decided to do something useful by supplying insurrectionary forces inside the country with the weapons and the technical assistance they need."

No one outside the Government can speak with real assurance about a question of palpable strategic secrecy. Yet the testimony of informed Cubans is that United States policy has been not to encourage such an indigenous uprising. Rather, the emphasis is on exile politics. The result is to disarm psychologically those inside Cuba who might be tempted to take a chance on insurrection. Their feeling is that those who are living in safe exile would reap the benefit and would indiscriminately punish as "Communists" anybody who had not broken openly with the regime. They have no awareness that an alternative is available to them.

Any policy aimed at pro-

moting internal change would have to begin by altering the over-all climate by making clear that the United States does not regard all who are in the Cuban army and government as Communists by definition. This would have to be followed by calculated political appeals intended to divide Castro from his followers. Plainly, such an approach would entail risks and would take time and patient effort.

It would involve the United States in fostering a "war of national liberation" on an island where national tradition and logistic fact would enable a true spirit of resistance to develop. One proposal the hemisphere foreign ministers might consider when they gather in New York is a declaration expressing the intent of the American republics to come to the assistance of any uprising that takes place on Cuban soil against the Soviet occupation.

As it stands, North Americans are frustrated and Cubans of all shades of opinion are angry with Washington. Luis Aguilar Leon, writing in *The New Leader*, speaks for many free-minded Cubans in remarking acidly:

"Of all the lessons Fidel Castro has taught us, the bitterest and most obvious is this: He who proclaims himself a Communist can count on help from the Soviet Union even though he is 9,000 miles away from its borders, while he who proclaims himself a democrat can fight and die 90 miles from the shores of the United States and no one will come to his aid."

This is a reproach that may be cruel and unfair, but the only satisfactory response to it would be effective action.